Fix a couple security issues related to dmail permalinks. Dmails have a
permalink that you can give to a Mod to let them read the dmail. This is
done with a key param that grants access when the dmail is opened by
another user. The key param had several problems:
* The key contained a full copy of the message's title and body encoded in
base64. This meant that anyone given a dmail permalink could read the
full dmail just by decoding the key in the link, without even having
to open the link.
* The key was derived from the dmail's title and body. If you knew or
could guess a dmail's title and body you could open the dmail. One
case when this was possible was when sending dmails. You could send
someone a dmail, take the permalink from your sent copy of the dmail,
then increment the dmail id to open the receiver's copy of the dmail.
Since the sent copy and the received copy both had the same title and
body, they both had the same dmail key. This let you check whether a
person had read your dmail, and what time they read it at.
* The key verification was done with an insecure string comparison
rather than a secure constant-time comparison. This was potentially
vulnerable to timing attacks.
* Opening a dmail belonging to another user would mark it as read for them.
The fix to all this is to use the dmail's id as the key instead of the
dmail's title and body. This means that old permalinks no longer work.
This is unavoidable given the issues above.
Other changes:
* The name of the 'Permalink' link is now 'Share'.
* Anyone with the 'Share' link can view the dmail, not just Mods.
73219f38ce